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1 ABSTRACT 
This study explores the adverse impacts of terrorism on the net Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) flows to Pakistan. Since 2003, terrorist violence has killed over 52,000 individuals in 
Pakistan. The unrelenting violence has substantially increased investment and security 
risks. This study uses time series econometrics to develop theoretically and empirically 
sound estimates for the impact of terrorism on FDI flows. This study has found that an 
increase in terrorist violence reduces FDI. Furthermore, the disaggregated analysis by 
individual sectors explores the nuances in considerations for FDI, where some sectors are 
affected while others remain immune to terrorism-related risks. 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment; Terrorism; Pakistan; ARMAX Model 
JEL codes: F23; D74; N45 
2 INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the NATO‟s intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan has faced intense terrorist 
activities. The Afghan Taliban and their allies in Pakistan have been fighting with the 
NATO troops and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. At the same time, Afghan and Pakistani 
Taliban started a violent insurgency in Pakistan (Haider, 2011 and 2013). In the past few 
years, terrorism has spread to all corners of Pakistan. Since 2003, more than 52,000 
individuals, including 19,000 civilians, have lost their lives to terrorism (South Asia 
Terrorism Portal, 2014). 
Recent studies have analyzed the macroeconomic determinants (Ismail and Amjad, 2014) 
and consequences (Malik and Zaman, 2013) of terrorism in Pakistan. Other more focused 
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work analyzed the impact of terrorism on Pakistan‟s economy, including foreign direct 
investments (FDI). For instance, Mughal and Anwar (2014) observed that the lack of a 
social safety net in Pakistan has resulted in greater remittances from expatriates to their 
family members who suffer from direct and indirect impacts of terrorist violence. Mehmood 
(2013) estimated the impact of terrorism on GDP growth, FDI, and foreign worker 
remittances to Pakistan during 1973 and 2008. He relied on the Global Terrorism Database 
along with macroeconomic indicators from the Central Bank of Pakistan and reported that 
Pakistan lost 33% of its real national income over this period. This is equivalent to losing 
1% GDP per capita annually. The loss comes mostly in the form of reduced FDI and foreign 
worker remittances. 
Other studies on the impact of terrorism on Pakistan, while being valuable, suffer from 
several methodological shortcomings. For instance, Rasheed and Tahir (2012), using annual 
data from 2003 to 2011, investigate the relationship between terrorist attacks and FDI 
inflows to Pakistan. The authors used a data set with only nine observations, which are not 
sufficient for time series analysis.  
Using financial data from 2006 to 2008, Gul et al. (2010) found that terrorism adversely 
affected the performance of the Karachi Stock Exchange, Pakistan‟s largest bourse. 
However, they found a statistically insignificant, yet negative, association between terrorist 
activities and both FOREX and the interbank markets.  
Their study, however, also had several methodological shortcomings. They examined 
attacks on political figures as proxies for terrorist activity and ignored frequent terrorist 
attacks on ordinary citizens, who, unlike politicians, are not guarded against attacks. This 
could be a serious limitation since ordinary citizens and businessmen are more frequently 
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affected by terrorism than politicians, who are well-guarded (Czinkota et al, 2005; Brandt 
and Sandler, 2010; and Llussá and Tavares, 2011).  In addition, Gul et al. (2010) applied 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and ignored concerns about stationarity and serial 
autocorrelation. OLS is known to return spurious results if stationarity assumptions are 
violated. 
The business community is increasingly vulnerable in Pakistan because of the confluence of 
terrorists and criminal elements that has resulted in an alarming increase in kidnappings 
for ransom. Several individuals including an American consultant (Londoño, 2013), the son 
of a former prime minister (Dawn, 2013), the son of the former governor of Pakistan‟s most 
populated province (Punjab) who was himself assassinated by a policeman in his own 
security detail (Dawn, 2011), and a vice chancellor of a university (Express Tribune, 2010) 
are some of the prominent figures who are being held hostage by militants for years. 
Several businesspersons in Pakistan‟s largest and most industrious city, Karachi, have 
been abducted and were released only after paying millions in ransom (Mirza, 2013).  
 
2.1.1 Theoretical framework for Foreign Direct Investments 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) are caused by structural market imperfections and a 
firm‟s desire to exploit its ownership advantages (Hymer, 1976). Buckley and Casson (1976, 
2002) also state that market imperfections cause FDI. They argue that high risks and 
uncertainty in FDI lead to higher transaction and bargaining costs. Williamson (1975) 
explains that firms internationalize to exploit external opportunities or internal efficiencies. 
The question remains, what motivates a firm to engage in FDI? Dunning (1979, 1988) 
frames the eclectic theory of foreign direct investment in the „OLI‟ framework where a firm 
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must possess three types of advantages for successful FDI: ownership advantages (O), 
location advantages (L), and internalization advantages (I). Ownership advantages are 
firm-specific, such as the firm‟s size, product diversification, and trademarks. Location 
specific advantages are the characteristics of the host country, such as growing economies, 
natural resources, lower transportation and communication costs, growth-friendly policies, 
political stability, and robust judicial systems. Put simply, a firm carries out FDI only when 
location and ownership advantages make production abroad profitable, otherwise the firm 
will cover the overseas markets through other modes, e.g., licensing or trade. 
FDI typically consists of long-term investments that may not be easily reversed. In other 
words, the investment itself becomes a barrier to exit for Multinational Companies (MNCs), 
who prefer to invest in growing and stable economies (Rivoli & Salorio, 1996; Bandera & 
White, 1968; Lunn, 1980; Schneider & Frey, 1985). Terrorist activities in host countries, for 
instance, would deter MNCs to invest because they are interested in the long-term 
prospects of FDI. 
The economic consequences of terrorism have been the subject of recent research. Li (2011), 
for instance, views terrorism as an extreme form of political instability that affects the FDI 
in several ways: Terrorism hurts physical infrastructure and human capital, imposes 
financial constraints, and slows economic growth. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) 
estimated that terrorism caused a 10% drop in per-capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
the Basque Country over two decades. Between 1975 and 1991, terrorism, on average, 
reduced net FDI flows to Spain by 13.5% and to Greece by 11.9% (Enders and Sandler, 
1996). Becker and Murphy (2001) observed that the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, in the United States caused a loss of 0.06% of the US economy‟s total productive 
assets. Bloomberg et al. (2004), using the ITERATE data for 177 countries from 1968 to 
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2000, estimated that terrorism caused a 0.5% decline in annual national economic growth. 
Tavares (2004), using a cross-country dataset for the 1987-2001 time period, also found that 
a one standard deviation increase in terrorist incidents was correlated with a 0.2% decline 
in GDP. Similarly, Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) observed that terrorist attacks reduced per-
capita output by 3 to 5%, and annual per-capita consumption by about 5% in the Israeli 
economy. 
Relying on investment data from 510 Indian farmers in 46 sub-districts during July 1978 to 
June 1990, Singh (2013) found that terrorism was negatively associated with the level of 
investment in the long term. However, these effects were small and statistically 
insignificant during the short term. He noticed that the cost of borrowing for farmers 
increased due to terrorism-related uncertainty. Another study also found that FDI inflows 
to 136 developing countries were significantly affected by terrorism (Alomar and El-Sakka, 
2011). 
Terrorist incidents in a host country, whether in the context of a developing or advanced 
economy, increase uncertainty, which deters foreign investors. For instance, Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2008) found that FDI inflows to the US declined from 15.8% of the Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation in 2000 (before 9/11 attacks) to 1.5% in 2003. At the same time, 
FDI outflows of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation increased from 7.2 % in 2000 to 7.5% in 
2003. The authors also observed a 5% decline in the net foreign direct investment for a one 
standard deviation increase in the terrorist risk. 
Terrorism increases transaction costs because of higher spending on increased security 
measures (Johnston and Nedelescu, 2005; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008). Additional 
security costs may cause a firm to lose its price competitiveness in international markets 
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(Moshirian, 2006). Terrorist incidents also trigger a drop in asset prices and the flight of 
capital, causing an increase in borrowing costs for firms (IMF, 2001b; Johnston and 
Nedelescu, 2005). 
MNCs may experience higher operating costs because of the higher taxes required to 
combat terrorism and to improve security. Terrorism also causes governments to be more 
vigilant with private financial transactions to prevent funding of terrorist activities from 
abroad (Li, 2011). Terrorism causes an increase in defense budgets, which ultimately 
redirects resources away from more productive uses.  
Earlier research in political instability and FDI has returned mixed findings. Several 
studies (e.g. Schneider and Frey, 1985; Woodward and Rolfe, 1993) report a negative 
correlation between political instability and FDI inflows. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) 
observed a negative correlation between direct investments and terrorist violence. 
Similarly, Nigh (1985) finds that both international and intra-nation conflicts affect FDI 
from the US multinationals. However, Fatehi-Sedeh and Safizadeh (1989) find a 
statistically insignificant association between political stability and FDI.  
Other research suggests that investors respond to terrorism in a heterogeneous manner 
(Agrawal, 2010). An analysis of FDI inflows from 34 OECD member countries for 12 
industrial sectors from 1985 to 2009 shows a significant but inconsistent relationship 
between terrorism and FDI. From a list of 12 broad industrial sectors, FDI inflows for 
manufacturing, trade, repair, and construction returned a statistically significant negative 
correlation with terrorist events, whereas other sectors were found to be statistically 
insignificant. Agarwal (2010) observed that the ability of investors to absorb or discount 
future risk is influenced by other economic or political factors.  
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Terrorism related uncertainty and risk affect other aspects of the economy, such as trade. 
For instance, terrorism reduces bilateral trade flows because strict border regulation adds 
to the transaction costs. Fratianni and Kang (2006) suggest that terrorism redirects some 
trade from neighbouring to more distant countries. Similarly, Nitsch and Schumacher 
(2004), using data on 200 countries from 1960 to 1993, observed that a 100% increase in 
terrorist attacks decreased bilateral trade by 4%.  
Terrorism also impacts tourism in the afflicted countries and regions. Enders et al. (1992) 
examined tourism data for seven Western European countries covering the period between 
1968 and 1988. They found that terrorism deterred tourists from some, but not all 
countries. Between January 1997 and December 2006, terrorism caused a decline of six 
million tourists in Turkey, which reduced tourism spending by $700 million in 2006 alone 
(Yaya, 2009).  
The literature review exposes the gaps in methodology and scope. Most studies have 
focused on aggregated FDI, implying that the impact of terrorism does not differ by 
industrial sectors. In Pakistan‟s context, most studies used inadequate modelling tools that 
failed to account for the time series-specific attributes of the data. Our proposed 
methodology, in the following section, addresses these shortcomings.  
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study is to determine if the frequently occurring terrorist violence in 
Pakistan has an impact on the FDI flows to Pakistan. The literature suggests that terrorist 
violence creates uncertainty and increases risks that may deter FDI flows. Earlier research 
has tested the assumptions using the time series data and ARIMA models. Building on the 
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published literature, this study also uses time series data for net FDI flows to Pakistan and 
fatalities resulting from terrorist violence. 
3.1 DATA  
We obtained the time series data on net FDI from the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The 
time series data are differentiated by major industrial sectors. One of the key motivations 
for this study was to determine the impact of terrorism on net FDI to particular industrial 
sectors. It is quite possible that certain industrial sectors may not be sensitive to the 
instability and accentuated risk as a result of the nature of investments or the immediacy 
of the need of their products. At the same time, higher risks may be indicative of even 
higher payoff for FDI. The disaggregated data on the net FDI thus allows us to determine 
the impact of terrorist activities on net FDI to industrial sectors in Pakistan.  
The FDI data covers the period of July 2001 to November 2011. SBP reports NFDI inflows 
for several aggregated industrial sectors. At the aggregate level, NFDI flows demonstrated 
a tendency to increase from 2001 until 2007, and plummeted afterwards (Figure 1). At the 
sectoral level, we have shortlisted the top-10 grossing sectors for NFDI inflows to Pakistan 
(Figure 2). The communications sector received the highest investment, followed by 
finance/banking, and oil and gas. This study analyzes monthly FDI at the sectoral level. We 
excluded sectors that had infrequent transactions. 
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Figure 1: NFDI inflows to Pakistan at aggregate level from 2001-2011   
 
 
Figure 2: NFDI inflows to Pakistan in top 10 sectors from 2001-2011     
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We obtained the data on terrorism-related fatalities from South Asia Terrorism Portal 
(SATP). Defining what constitutes terrorism could be a complicated endeavour. One 
person‟s freedom fighter is another person‟s terrorist. We have followed SATP‟s definition of 
terrorism, which states that an “act or acts of criminal violence, or the sequence of actions 
leading to such an act or acts, which is/are intended to intimidate the public, coerce or 
unduly compel a government or public authority to perform or abstain from performing any 
act; or to destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures of a country; or to overawe any public functionary or government agency.”1 
SATP diligently maintains data on terrorist activities and has provided aggregate monthly 
statistics on deaths and injuries for civilians, law enforcement personnel, and those 
identified as terrorists. SATP compiles statistics from incidents reported by the news 
media. To date, no other source for information is available that tabulates and provides 
detailed accounts of terrorist activities in Pakistan for the study period. Other sources with 
similar data, such as International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), 
and Global Terrorism Database (GTD) at the University of Maryland, either do not cover 
the entire time period or lack event-specific narratives that are available from SATP. 
SATP data has maintained statistics on terrorism-related fatalities in Pakistan since 2003. 
The terrorist-related violence peaked in June 2009 (Figure 3). The monthly time series data 
presents a breakdown of casualties by civilians, security force personnel, and insurgents. In 
this paper we have used the number of total deaths including civilians, security personnel, 
and insurgents, as a proxy for terrorist violence in Pakistan.  
                                               
1 We thank SATP for providing us their definition of terrorism upon request. The definition is not 
available online. Dr. Ajai of SATP provided this definition in personal communication with the 
authors.  
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The choice of a proxy for terrorist activities is not without controversy. In earlier research, 
country risk ratings have been used as a proxy for terrorism-related activities (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2008). It has been argued that the number of casualties is a poor indicator of 
terrorism because terrorist incidents are of different magnitude and significance. For cross-
sectional studies, this argument may be valid. However, for monthly time series data, as is 
the case in our study, the frequency of events and the number of fatalities do account for 
the difference in magnitude and significance of terrorist attacks.  
 
Figure 3: Terrorism related fatalities in Pakistan 
While the NFDI inflows are available from July 2001 to November 2011, the fatalities data 
are available for January 2003 to November 2011. Thus, this study is confined to the period 
of January 2003 to November 2011. 
3.2 METHODS 
The literature review conducted earlier helped us select the Auto-regressive Integrated 
Moving Average (ARMAX) models with exogenous variables as the preferred modelling 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
J
a
n
-2
0
0
3
J
u
n
-2
0
0
3
N
o
v
-2
0
0
3
A
p
r-
2
0
0
4
S
e
p
-2
0
0
4
F
e
b
-2
0
0
5
J
u
l-
2
0
0
5
D
e
c-
2
0
0
5
M
a
y
-2
0
0
6
O
ct
-2
0
0
6
M
a
r-
2
0
0
7
A
u
g
-2
0
0
7
J
a
n
-2
0
0
8
J
u
n
-2
0
0
8
N
o
v
-2
0
0
8
A
p
r-
2
0
0
9
S
e
p
-2
0
0
9
F
e
b
-2
0
1
0
J
u
l-
2
0
1
0
D
e
c-
2
0
1
0
M
a
y
-2
0
1
1
O
ct
-2
0
1
1
Terrorism related fatalities in Pakistan 
Page - 13 
platform. Several studies in the past have used the same modelling framework because it is 
particularly suited for the time series nature of our data set. While other time series 
techniques, such as VAR or VECM, have been used in the past, we believe that these 
models are not suited for our needs primarily because we believe that the causality in our 
models occurs in only one plausible direction, i.e., terrorism impacts (causes) FDI and not 
the other way around. 
This study analyzes the impact of terrorism on FDI flows to individual industrial sectors, in 
addition to the impact on total FDI flows. This is done to determine whether the impact 
varies by industrial sector. We have estimated ARMAX models for each sector and treated 
terrorism-related fatalities as the exogenous variable to determine the impact of terrorism 
on the sector‟s NFDI inflows. As mentioned earlier, only the top-10 sectors by FDI flows are 
included in this study. We estimated 11 models, one for the total NFDI and 10 sectoral FDI. 
We adopted the following methodology for the analysis: 
1. Test stationarity for FDI flows for individual industrial sectors. 
2. Determine the lag structure for autoregressive and moving average components of 
the ARMAX models. 
3. Estimate ARMAX models for FDI flows for individual sectors. 
4. Conduct tests to determine residuals are white noise. 
We estimated an ARMAX model with robust standard errors, which is also recommended 
by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) to control for a mild violation of the distribution assumption 
that the variance equals the mean. Also, for state-space models in general and ARMAX and 
ARIMA models in particular, the robust or quasi–maximum likelihood estimates (QMLEs) 
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of variance are robust to the symmetric non-normality in disturbances, including, as a 
special case, heteroskedasticity (Stata, 2009). 
The theoretical model is presented below: 
                                  
Where          is the net foreign direct investment in sector i at time t,    is terrorism-
related fatalities at time t, and εt is the disturbance term [N~iid (0,σ)].  
A simple ARMAX (p, q) model can be expressed as:  
                                                                            
In this form, the model has lagged dependent and independent variables and a moving 
average disturbance. We assume that the errors are independently and identically 
distributed, with zero mean, constant variance, and zero covariance. Prior to running the 
ARMAX model on each of the time series, we applied the Johansen Cointegration test to 
determine whether a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between the two time series. 
We found no evidence of co-integration. 
We present the results in the next section followed by a discussion of results. 
4 RESULTS 
Summary statistics on monthly time series data for net FDI flows and terrorism-related 
violence in Pakistan are presented in Table 1. Our sample indicates that on average, 28 
bomb blasts occurred each month in Pakistan during the study period (July 2001 to 
November 2011), resulting in approximately 358 casualties per month. The average 
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monthly FDI flows equalled $208 million. Communications, financial business, and the oil 
and gas sectors, respectively, received the highest monthly net FDI flows. 
Table 1: Summary statistics for FDI flows and terrorism related casualties 
 
* FDI numbers are in 2001 constant dollars (millions).  
4.1 UNIT ROOT TESTS 
This paper uses an ARMAX model to investigate the relationship between terrorism-related 
violence and NFDI inflows to Pakistan. The ARMAX model is an extension of the Box–
Jenkins autoregressive moving average (ARIMA) model with exogenous variables. ARMAX 
models require the dependent variable to be stationary, i.e., having constant mean and 
variance, and constant auto-covariances over time. We have therefore tested each 
dependent variable for stationarity using the unit root tests.  
We have used the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests to test the null hypothesis that a 
unit root exists, or that the underlying time series is I(1). ADF tests require that we specify 
the number of lags. Baketi (2013, pp. 383) recommends that the frequency of the time series 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Net FDI in All Sectors 125 176.3 172.4 17.0 1010.7
Net FDI in Communications 125 50.2 107.2 -38.1 632.5
Net FDI in Financial Business 125 33.9 68.4 -24.7 579.9
Net FDI in Oil and Gas 125 31.1 23.3 8.3 126.7
Net FDI in Trade 125 6.1 6.8 -13.5 26.8
Net FDI in Power 125 6.1 23.4 -68.0 230.7
Net FDI in Construction 125 4.9 5.3 0.0 28.3
Net FDI in Transport 125 3.9 3.8 0.2 17.6
Net FDI in Petroleum Refining 125 3.9 4.8 -3.5 20.2
Net FDI in Chemicals 125 4.0 7.7 -14.4 72.8
Net FDI in Personal Services 125 3.6 3.1 -0.5 19.6
Total Casualties 107 358.4 394.3 1.0 2024.0
Page - 16 
should be used for specifying the number of lags. We are using the monthly time series 
data; hence we have conducted ADF tests with 12 lags for each time series. The results are 
reported in Table 2. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root for all except the FDI 
flows in the Chemicals sector. Based on the results in Table 2, we treat all time series 
(including Chemicals) as I(1) and estimate the ARMAX models with first-differenced data 
as the dependent variables. 
Table 2: Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests for stationarity 
 
* We reject the null hypothesis of Unit Root. 
4.2 ARMAX MODELS  
The ARMAX models require one to first specify the order (p) for the auto-regressive (AR) 
part and (q) for the moving average (MA) disturbances. We used autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelation functions to determine the adequate structure of lags required by the 
model. Results are presented in Table 3.  
 
Augmented Dickey Fuller 
Test (12 lags) ADF test statistics 
Critical Value 
 (at 5 %) 
NFDI in All Sectors -1.35 -2.9
NFDI in Communications -1.39 -2.9
NFDI in Financial Business -2.07 -2.9
NFDI in Oil and Gas -0.88 -2.9
NFDI in Trade 0.03 -2.9
NFDI in Power -2.61 -2.9
NFDI in Construction -1.68 -2.9
NFDI in Transport -1.58 -2.9
NFDI in Petroleum Refining -1.85 -2.9
NFDI in Chemicals* -3.28 -2.9
NFDI in Personal Services -1.42 -2.9
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Table 3: Lag structure for variables based on AC and PAC tests 
 
 
The lag structures specified in Table 3 help us specify the model. The time series data for 
all sectors is differenced. The numbers of casualties are included in the model without any 
transformation. Results for the total FDI flows, Communications, Finance and Business, 
Oil and Gas, and Trade are presented in Table 4 and the results for the remaining sectors 
are presented in Table 5. We estimated a model for each time series using the specified lag 
structures in Table 3. However, we systematically reduced the number of lags and settled 
the final models based on AIC and BIC. Thus Table 4 and Table 5 present the final models 
that returned the lowest values for AIC and BIC. We were also motivated by concerns for 
parsimony and preferred simple over more complex specifications. Lastly, the reported 
standard errors are semi-robust and were generated using the robust option in Stata. 
 
The results are organized as follows in Table 4 and Table 5. The model specification is 
presented in the first row. The second row is merely an index representing results for FDI 
flows. The third column lists the names of individual time series. Variables and estimated 
results are listed in the first column. The model for total FDI flows was specified as ARIMA 
Time Series
Number of lags for 
autoregressive term
Number of lags for 
moving average term 
NFDI in All Sectors (D1*) 1,2,4,5,9 1, 6
NFDI in Communications (D1) 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 1
NFDI in Financial Business (D1) 1,2 1
NFDI in Oil and Gas (D1) 1,2,5, 8 1,2,3,6,9, 12
NFDI in Trade (D1) 1,2 1,3
NFDI in Power (D1) 1,2,3,4 1
NFDI in Construction (D1) 1,3,4 1
NFDI in Transport (D1) 1,2 1
NFDI in Petroleum Refining (D1) 1 1
NFDI in Chemicals (D1) 1,2,3,4 1
NFDI in Personal Services (D1) 1,2,4, 6,9 1
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(1,1,1), suggesting that the time series was differenced once and the model includes an 
auto-regressive component as well as a disturbance. 
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Table 4: ARMAX models for total FDI flows and top-four industrial sectors by FDI volumes 
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Table 5: ARMAX models for bottom six industrial sectors by FDI volume 
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Based on the results presented earlier, we find that casualties returned a statistically 
significant and negative impact on the total net FDI flows. This suggests that the growth in 
total FDI flows (remember the time series is first-differenced) is impacted negatively by the 
increase in terrorism related fatalities. A quick scan of the results reveals that terrorism 
related violence has a negative and statistically significant impact on the following sectors: 
- Total FDI flows 
- Communications 
- Finance and Business 
- Trade 
- Construction 
- Chemicals 
- Personal services 
At the same time, FDI flows to the following sectors reported a negative, yet statistically 
insignificant impact of terrorism-related fatalities: 
- Oil and Gas 
- Power 
- Transport 
- Petroleum refining 
4.2.1 White noise tests 
After estimating the parameters, we performed several tests to determine if the estimated 
residuals were indeed white noise, a precondition for a good model fit. Table 6 presents the 
results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test and the Phillip-Peron (PP) Test for 
white noise. The results of these tests indicate that the residuals meet the conditions for 
white noise. 
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Table 6: White Noise Tests of residuals 
 
5 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
This paper explores the impact of terrorism-related risks and uncertainty on net FDI flows 
to various industrial sectors in Pakistan. The literature reviewed earlier suggested that 
terrorism imposes additional costs and creates inefficiencies that make the host country 
less desirable for FDI. The results presented in the last section confirm the findings of 
earlier research. We, too, have found a negative correlation between terrorism-related 
casualties and FDI flows to Pakistan. 
Our results, however, are slightly more nuanced. We have found a statistically significant, 
negative impact between total FDI flows and terrorism for Pakistan. However, when we 
break down the FDI flows by industrial sector, we obtain mixed results. Certain industrial 
sectors report statistically significant impacts while others do not. This begs the question: 
why some sectors are more impacted by others? 
Time Series
ADF test 
statistics on 
residuals
PP test statistics 
on residuals
Critical Value 
(at 5 %) 
NFDI in All Sectors (D1*) -10.14 -10.16 -2.89
NFDI in Communications (D1) -10.09 -10.12 -2.89
NFDI in Financial Business (D1) -10.53 -10.53 -2.89
NFDI in Oil and Gas (D1) -5.78 -11.20 -2.89
NFDI in Trade (D1) -10.84 -10.82 -2.89
NFDI in Power (D1) -10.29 -10.29 -2.89
NFDI in Construction (D1) -10.63 -10.67 -2.89
NFDI in Transport (D1) -10.43 -10.43 -2.89
NFDI in Petroleum Refining (D1) -10.25 -10.26 -2.89
NFDI in Chemicals (D1) -10.12 -10.12 -2.89
NFDI in Personal Services (D1) -10.10 -10.12 -2.89
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Given the limited information brought to bear in the models presented here, it is not 
possible to explore the reasons behind why significance is found for some sectors and not in 
others. We can still draw some general conclusions. We can divide the industrial sectors 
into urban or service-oriented sectors, and the raw industrial sectors. Examples of service-
oriented sectors are communications, business and finance, construction, and personal 
services. These sectors are the ones that report a statistically significant and negative 
impact of terrorism. The urban nature of these sectors puts them close to terrorism, which 
in Pakistan is largely concentrated among a handful of large cities. The industrial sectors, 
such as oil and gas, petroleum financing, and power attract investments in remote areas 
that have largely avoided terrorism. Thus, we find a negative, yet statistically insignificant 
impact of terrorism on such sectors. The transport sector, which also returns an 
insignificant relationship, appears to be an anomaly given the urban orientation of the 
sector and numerous targeted attacks on transport infrastructures and services.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This study has estimated the negative impact of terrorist violence on Pakistan‟s economy, 
in particular on FDI flows. The study has found a significant impact of terrorism-related 
fatalities on net FDI flows to Pakistan. This impact, however, is largely confined to certain 
sectors, namely communications, financial business, trade, construction, and personal 
services. Other sectors, such as oil and gas, power, and petroleum financing returned 
negative, yet statistically insignificant results, suggesting that the firms involved in those 
sectors can obtain higher abnormal profits because of higher risks.   
The government of Pakistan estimates billions of dollars of economic losses resulting from 
NATO‟s war in Afghanistan (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2014). Some of these costs are a 
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direct result of the militancy and violence that has targeted civilians, law enforcement 
agencies, and public infrastructure. The uncertainty, chaos, and other economic 
inefficiencies resulting from such violence have hurt Pakistan‟s economy on several levels, 
including rendering the country less attractive for investments.  
Using time series econometrics, as well as data on net FDI flows and terrorism-related 
fatalities, this study offers further proof of a direct link between terrorism and FDI flows to 
Pakistan. The study has further illustrated that FDI flows to certain industrial sectors 
(urban and service-oriented) are more susceptible to terrorism than other sectors that 
attract investments to remotely located facilities. 
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